When one party offers testimony explaining a disputed document, the other party’s ability to answer can become as important as the original ruling. Nevin Shetty’s July 31, 2026 appellate opening brief argues that this principle was compromised when the government presented opinions about Fabric’s investment policy while the defense’s proposed expert interpretations were restricted.
The argument concerns the opportunity to offer counterproof. Counsel says the jury heard testimony supporting the government’s interpretation without hearing the specialized response the defense had proposed. The appeal asks the Ninth Circuit to consider both the individual evidentiary decisions and the way those decisions operated together on a central issue in the case.
The same subject appeared on both sides
According to the brief, the government initially argued that the policy’s meaning could be understood from its plain language without expert help. It later supported director and officer opinions about the policy as helpful to the jury. Counsel identifies the tension between those positions as an important part of the appeal.
The district court, as recounted in the brief, allowed some general expert testimony but excluded proposed defense opinions about the particular policy. It also allowed certain director and officer opinions under conditions tied to corporate capacity and Shetty’s knowledge. The appeal argues that the resulting trial allowed the prosecution’s interpretation to receive testimonial support while the defense’s interpretation did not receive the proposed expert support.
That description is more exact than saying one side could call witnesses and the other could not. The claimed imbalance concerned a particular subject and particular opinions. Focusing on that level permits assessment of whether the reasons for excluding one form of testimony were compatible with the reasons for admitting the other.
Symmetry does not mean identical witnesses
Experts and lay witnesses are governed by different admissibility requirements. Evidence offered in response still needs an appropriate foundation, relevance, and compliance with the applicable rules. The fact that the government introduced testimony on a subject does not automatically make every defense opinion about the same subject admissible.
The defense’s stronger point is that the court should assess the response in light of the issue actually presented to the jury. If the prosecution relies on witness interpretation of a policy, an argument that all interpretation is unnecessary because jurors can simply read the document becomes harder to sustain without further explanation.
That is the consistency question the appeal raises. Counsel argues that the defense experts could offer useful, properly limited analysis of the same policy provisions. The asserted error lies in denying that opportunity for reasons the defense considers incompatible with the treatment of the government’s testimony, rather than in a claim that the two witness categories are interchangeable.
The proposed response existed before trial
The July 2024 filing defending expert testimony shows that the defense identified the desired assistance well before the verdict. It described corporate-law experts who would discuss officer responsibilities, policy terminology, and how a corporate officer might reasonably interpret the document. Counsel also distinguished those opinions from direct testimony about Shetty’s actual intent.
The opening brief uses that earlier position to explain what it says was missing from the trial. The proposed response was not an unspecified wish for more favorable evidence. It involved named experts, disclosed subjects, and an identified relationship to the authorization defense.
That specificity matters when considering prejudice. It allows a reviewing court to compare the evidence the defense sought to present with the evidence and argument the jury actually received, as described in the appellate record. The question becomes whether the exclusion removed a meaningful response to a central prosecution position.
The constitutional argument adds another layer
The appeal invokes the constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a defense. It argues that the combination of exclusions and admissions went beyond an ordinary evidentiary disagreement because the policy and the scope of authority were central to the defense’s theory.
That constitutional right does not abolish ordinary evidence rules. Courts can exclude evidence for legitimate reasons. The defense’s claim is that the rules were applied inconsistently and disproportionately in this instance, restricting a response counsel considered crucial. The appeal asks for assessment of that application, not a general exemption from courtroom standards.
The NACDL amicus brief submitted earlier in the case separately advocates careful limits on the use of fraud law in corporate disputes. It does not decide this evidentiary issue. Its relevance is the broader concern that a defendant receive a fair opportunity to address the legal and factual distinctions on which criminal liability depends.
Closing argument revealed the claimed consequence
The opening brief points to the government’s reliance in closing on testimony from directors and finance personnel. Counsel argues that the defense could discuss the policy but could not support its interpretation with the expert opinions the court had excluded. In that account, the problem became visible when the prosecution used its witnesses to answer the authorization defense.
A lawyer’s argument and witness testimony perform different roles. Counsel can explain an interpretation of an exhibit, but that does not necessarily replace specialized evidence about how the document functions. The appeal maintains that this difference gave the restrictions practical significance in the jury’s assessment of authority and intent.
The argument follows Shetty’s November 7, 2025 conviction on four wire-fraud counts and March 5, 2026 two-year prison sentence. His public materials provide a wider view of the documents and positions his defense has advanced. The July 31 brief seeks a new trial; it is not an appellate ruling establishing the asserted imbalance.
The appeal’s counterproof argument asks a fundamental question in a specific form: did the defense have an adequate, properly bounded opportunity to answer the interpretation the prosecution put before the jury? Examining that question means comparing the actual proffers and rulings. It gives Shetty’s challenge a concrete foundation in the fairness of the evidentiary process rather than a general complaint about an unfavorable outcome.
